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ACT 
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nikas.kallberg@hhs.se 
Mähring, Magnus, Stockholm School of Economics, Box 6501, SE-11383 Stockholm, 
Sweden, magnus.mahring@hhs.se 
Abstract 
What can an organization do when it has an opportunity to innovate with IT and faces pressure to im-
prove operations – but lacks the capabilities necessary to conduct IT-related organizational change 
efforts? In this paper, this challenging situation is explored with the help of the resource-based view of 
the firm. 
A case study of digital radiology implementation in a healthcare organization was conducted. In the 
case, the change process did not follow the canonical view of how IT-related change should be con-
ducted. Instead of a socio-technical, balanced change approach, where technology, processes, organ-
izational structures and people change in concert, this case exhibited successive, focused change ef-
forts targeting one organizational resource or capability at a time. The unorthodox change approach 
– a resource/capability re-balancing act rather than a case of balanced, socio-technical change – 
proved successful. 
The paper finds that pushing organizational change with technology may be a successful emergent 
strategy for IT-related change under difficult conditions. It also finds that by focusing one organiza-
tional resource or capability in each phase of a change effort, both short-term small wins and longer-
term improvement of the organization’s dynamic capabilities may be possible.  
Keywords: IT implementation, organizational change, resource-based view, dynamic capabilities, 
healthcare, case study. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Organizational change involving information technology is a complex process of mutual influence 
between an existing organization and a technology being implemented (Lee, 1999; Markus, 1983; Or-
likowski & Robey, 1991). After decades of research, much has been learnt about how this process 
should be conducted: Stakeholders should be involved in the change in a meaningful way to ensure 
that the outcomes are useful and accepted (Markus & Robey, 1983; Venkatesh et al., 2003). Relevant 
business processes should be redesigned to really make use of the technology (Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 
1998; Davenport, 1993). Change should be managed in a way that reduces the strain on the organiza-
tion and the people affected by change so that negative consequences do not prevail (Mumford, 1981). 
And yet, time and again, we see technology being “pushed” into an organization, as if outcomes would 
follow in an uncomplicated way. Research on IT-related change generally sees this as bad practice and 
as a recipe for failure (Markus & Benjamin, 1997; Robey & Boudreau, 1999). But is this really the 
case? And if so, why does practice not change? Could it be that the organization’s conditions and ca-
pabilities for change play a role in the formation of change approaches? 
In this paper, we use the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm (Barney, 1991; Teece et al., 1997) to 
explore a change effort in a radiology unit within a European for-profit healthcare organization, in 
which information technology was used to “push” organizational change. With the help of RBV, we 
explore shifts in focus of the change process over time, as well as the existence and evolution of the 
organization’s capabilities for effecting change (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Winter, 2003). The pur-
pose of the paper is to explore how an organization can employ IT to pursue organizational change 
when the capabilities required for the ideal (or canonical) approach to IT-related change are lacking. 
In the following, we first discuss IT-related change and the resource-based view of change, with focus 
on dynamic capabilities. Thereafter, we describe the case study research approach, which is followed 
by the case description. We then discuss the case and offer conclusions from the study. 
2 IT-RELATED CHANGE AND DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES 
IT-related organizational change has been studied extensively in the IS field. While the topic continues 
to intrigue and challenge researchers and practitioners alike, there is today a rather extensive body of 
knowledge on how IT-related change should be conducted, which includes critical success factors and 
central considerations to be made in the process (Lucas, 1981; Markus & Keil, 1994). Central themes 
in this literature include that the implementation process and its results should be organizationally and 
politically feasible, that stakeholders should be properly involved and managed, and that the participa-
tion, involvement and “buy-in” of users are crucial (Myers, 1994; Venkatesh et al., 2003). Further-
more, organization and technology need to be aligned, meshed together to harness the potential of IT. 
Therefore, redesign of business processes is key to achieving benefits from IT (Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 
1998; Davenport, 1993). 
These and additional well-established guidelines for IT-related change, firmly grounded in empirical 
research, can be seen as providing a canonical view: a view to which there is little opposition in IS 
research. Following Baskerville (1999), we use the term canonical to denote a dominant or standard 
view, not a single, unitary view. Furthermore, we do not claim that our short characterization of the 
canonical view of IT implementation covers all the nuances or provides a comprehensive overview of 
the literature. However, we do claim that there is such as thing as a dominant view. Indeed, when 
popular practice deviates from this view, academics are prone to criticize, such as in the case of 
techno-centric approaches to change (Biazzo, 1998; Davenport, 1995; Robey & Boudreau, 1999). 
Even when the case of technology-driven organizational change is acknowledged  (Markus, 2004), or 
when the change process is seen as more flexible, improvisational and open-ended (Orlikowski & 
844
Hofman, 1997), the view is still that changes in organizational structures and incentives, knowledge 
and skills, and attitudes should be concurrent with and integral to the technology implementation 
effort. 
The canonical view is well rooted in the organizational behavior and change literature, for example in 
its emphasis on conflict resolution, participation, and understanding technology adoption in its social 
context (Lewin, 1948; Lewin, 1958; Mumford & Banks, 1967; Trist, 1981). These findings have stood 
the test of time, although recent work sometimes acknowledges variations in implementation ap-
proaches (Nutt, 1998). The canonical view, however, demands that an organization is capable of 
managing change in the proper way. But what happens if an organization does not possess the capa-
bilities necessary for IT-related change? Can anything be done if an organization has repeatedly failed 




Description Relation to IS/IT implementation 
Process innovation Design and implementation of changes in 
operative processes that lead to improve-
ments in cycle time, quality of outputs, etc. 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000) 
Business process redesign (Davenport, 
1993; Markus, 2004) and its importance for 




Design and implementation of changes in 
organizational structures, control proce-
dures, etc. that change how the firm oper-
ates internally and in relation to its envi-
ronment (Zollo & Winter, 2002). 
Importance of IT solutions that are organi-
zationally valid and acceptable (Markus, 
1983; Markus & Robey, 1983). 




Selection, development and implementation 
of technological opportunities that integrate 
with organizational strategies and processes 
(Peppard & Ward, 2004). 
Amalgamation of organization and technol-
ogy (Lee, 1999). Integration of IT and busi-
ness issues (Feeny et al., 1992). 
Emotional 
Capability 
The organization’s acknowledgement of 
and attentiveness towards emotions of or-
ganizational members in relation to organ-
izational change efforts (Huy, 1999). 
Attention to stakeholder needs in imple-




Direction and implementation of planned 
change (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Zollo 
& Winter, 2002). 
User involvement and acceptance, align-
ment of interests, usage incentives (Markus 




Organization, staffing, management, control 
and execution of projects (Zollo & Winter, 
2002). 
Control, management and escalation avoid-
ance for IT projects (Keil et al., 2000; 
Kirsch, 1997) 
Table 1.  Dynamic capabilities related to evolution of organizational processes and structures, 
compared to key aspects of IS/IT implementation 
To explore these questions we employ the resource-based view of the firm (RBV), which sees firm 
performance as resulting from the management and use of resources and capabilities over time 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). While earlier theoretical contributions within RBV did not clearly distin-
guish between resources and capabilities, recent advances distinguish between the two concepts: Re-
sources are tangible (e.g. raw material in the firm’s possession) that can normally be owned in a legal 
sense. Capabilities are firm attributes that emerge through repeated execution of routines/processes  
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). They are nested within bundles of routines (e.g., product development) 
that employ resources to perform behaviors important for firm performance and/or competitiveness 
(Winter, 2003). Lately, increased attention has been devoted to the concept of dynamic capabilities, 
second-order capabilities that concern adaptation and renewal (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Zollo & 
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Winter, 2002). Dynamic capabilities can be defined as stable patterns of collective action through 
which the organization generates and modifies operating routines in pursuit of improvements (Zollo & 
Winter, 2002). Some dynamic capabilities are specifically related to changes in organizational proc-
esses and structures. Table 1 presents such dynamic capabilities identified in the literature and relates 
them to the IS/IT implementation literature. Central to the resource-based view is that capabilities are 
organization-level attributes, not individual or group traits (Winter, 2003). 
3 RESEARCH APPROACH 
A case study based on extensive field research within a radiology unit provided the empirical basis for 
this paper (Pettigrew, 1990; Yin, 2003). The first author participated in a change process over a period 
of three years, averaging two days per week in the organization. Throughout the period, the field re-
searcher was immersed in streams of organizational events at the research site (Evered & Louis, 
1981), but also devoted time to field note writing and to reflection away from the field. Following Yin 
(2003), interviews were conducted with medical professionals, managers and administrative staff and 
corporate documents were collected and corporate records surveyed. Access was granted to all histori-
cal and concurrent documents. Media coverage was also surveyed throughout the period. For events 
prior to the field researcher’s entry into the organization, particular care was taken to triangulate be-
tween data sources in order to arrive at a rich understanding of historical events (Golden, 1997; Mason 
et al., 1997). Table 2 provides an overview of data collection. 
 
Type of Data Collection Oct. ’02 – Jul. ‘03 Aug. ’03 – Jul. ‘04 Aug. ‘04 – May ‘06 
Days in the field Approx. 5 Approx. 100 Approx. 250 
Management meetings 1 Every/other week Every second week 
Department meetings 1 Once a month Once a month 
Impromptu discussions with actors 5 >200 >200 
Discussions with unit manager Approx. 10 Daily Every second day 
Process team meetings None Approx. 20 Approx. 50 
E-mail correspondence Approx. 20 2-3 per day 3 per day 
Recorded interviews 9 8 2 
Documents > 500 pages > 1000 pages > 1000 pages 
Corporate records Continuous Access Continuous Access Continuous Access 
Media coverage Approx. 20 articles Approx. 20 articles Approx. 40 articles 
Table 2.  Overview of Field Research and Related Data Collection over Time. 
To counter potential biases in data collection and representation, the second author, who did not par-
ticipate in the field, was assigned the role of challenging the field researcher’s view of events. A dia-
lectical process was employed in which the field researcher offered descriptions and explanations of 
events and the non-field researcher questioned the observations and offered alternative analyses of 
events based on the literature (Eisenhardt, 1989). In analyzing the case data, we used a process-cen-
tered approach (Langley, 1999), looking for phases and shifts in the change process. Mapping the 
process according to key concept from RBV, we detected that the change process could be understood 
as a sequence of phases, each characterized by the focus of the change effort. The case narrative was 
thus structured chronologically and in accordance with the identified phases. Finally, we analyzed ex-
istence and evolution of dynamic capabilities for each phase (cf. Table 1). 
4 A CASE OF DIGITAL RADIOLOGY IMPLEMENTATION 
In this section we describe organizational change at a radiology business unit within PHCO Radiology 
(a pseudonym), a major division within a Northern European for-profit healthcare organization. The 
case spans the years 2002 to 2005, but we also provide an exposé of the historical background of the 
846
unit as a department within a major city hospital. In 2002, the unit had approximately 100 employees, 
most of which belonging to four groups: physicians, nurses, assistant nurses and medical secretaries. 
4.1 Prologue: A History of Stability and Troubled Change 
For decades, the radiology unit had operated under highly stable conditions in terms of clinical proce-
dures, equipment, staff turnover, organization and environment. The heads of the unit had traditionally 
been highly renowned physicians who stayed in the position between ten and 25 years. Until the late 
1990s, the unit was a department within a large, public city hospital and delivered services almost ex-
clusively to other hospital departments. During the 1990s, the department faced recurrent demands to 
reduce costs. At this time, other radiology departments made the shift to digital radiology technology 
for imaging and administrative procedures. The new technology was frequently depicted as challeng-
ing existing work procedures and expertise. It was also described as a means for achieving major im-
provements in productivity, although reports from early adopters indicated that cost savings (and re-
lated personnel reductions) often did not materialize. 
In the late 90’s the hospital was privatized. The new owner, here called Private Health Care Organiza-
tion (PHCO), transformed the radiology department into a business unit within division PHCO Radi-
ology. Within a few years, five successive business unit managers struggled to cope with accelerating 
demands for productivity increases. Digitization efforts were initiated and abandoned on several occa-
sions and several other productivity-development initiatives fell well short of demands and goals. 
The unsuccessful change initiatives, which included personnel reductions, led to resentment among 
personnel. This resentment was not only directed towards the business unit managers, but also in many 
cases towards the healthcare company that had taken over the hospital and the radiology unit: 
Finally I come to a radiology unit where everything works, where people are able to go home when they 
should and where everybody is content. And then along comes PHCO and after that everything just 
collapses…. If it was because of PHCO or if it was just a coincident I don’t know, but there have been 
reorganizations ever since. (Judy, resident physician) 
4.2 Phase 1: Re-initiating Change 
In 2002, the radiology unit was running a substantial operating deficit, which had increased several 
quarters in a row. PHCO operates as an independent healthcare provider within the public healthcare 
system and therefore the county sets price levels and service requirements. At this time, upon renewal 
of contract, the county forced a clause that stipulated a significant price reduction effective until the 
unit was able to produce and deliver digital radiology images and reports. 
The president of PHCO Radiology, frustrated with the unsuccessful change initiatives, personally took 
over management of the unit on an interim basis. He also initiated the acquisition of digital radiology 
equipment (called RIS/PACS, Radiology Information System/Picture Archiving Communication Sys-
tem) with the help of the PHCO IT department. A new business unit manager was hired in November, 
with a clear mission to digitize radiology operations within six months and implement personnel re-
ductions. The new manager was not a physician; she had experience from different types of organiza-
tions, including healthcare. Upon assuming the position, she found the impending digitization effort 
technology-focused: 
The task was to carry out digitization of radiology operations…. [They] had no thoughts about chang-
ing work procedures…. It was a pure technology acquisition…. (Anna, business unit manager) 
4.3 Phase 2: Broadening the Scope of the Change Effort 
The new manager spent a lot of time during her first months talking to the physicians, building trust. 
Soon after starting the job, she started to view the digitization project as problematic. Deadlines were 
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tight, the project charter was not well defined and project management did not function well. Further-
more, user representatives and domain experts were missing in the project. 
…it didn’t have anything to do with the actual clinical work…. There were really no healthcare profes-
sionals, no medical staff, in that project. (Anna, business unit manager) 
Before Anna came, the project was run as a tech project. Some people were to go. Logically, people 
knew that, but did not really want to grasp it. (Liza, personnel manager) 
The business unit manager hired an external consultant as project manager who formed a new project 
team with all occupational groups represented. The scope was widened to include process redesign. 
This was a very positive period. They saw that we listened to operations. (Adam, digitization-project 
manager) 
The project group identified a preferred RIS/PACS solution, with user requirements a major determi-
nant in the choice. The contract with the supplier was signed in February 2003. In parallel, the plan for 
personnel reductions was prepared by the business unit manager, who was also in contact with the 
unions and key staff concerning the reductions. 
4.4 Phase 3: Refocusing Technology Implementation 
During March and April of 2003, the subprojects ran into difficulties. Participants complained about 
not being able to devote time to project work, but in addition, there was a severe shortage of project 
skills in the project. Many of the medical staff did not have experience of working in a project. Moti-
vation and commitment was slumping.  
Two physicians… were supposed to represent the physicians in the team… but [it didn’t work], so there 
was a lot of frustration among the physicians during the spring…. [It] manifested itself in criticism 
against the project. They got upset when someone expressed a different viewpoint. They couldn’t work 
in [a project environment]. It was apparent that none of the occupational groups could cope [with pro-
ject work]. (Anna, business unit manager) 
It turned out that there is not much maturity in this organization in terms of working in accordance with 
a project model. ….They didn’t have the skills to conduct a workshop, collect and organize information, 
even at a basic level, those skills just aren’t there. (Adam, digitization-project manager) 
As project work was perceived increasingly difficult and unproductive, anxiety spread amongst staff. 
The business unit manager gradually realized that the aggressive timetable and the lack of necessary 
skills for process-design work were incompatible. At the next unit-wide information meeting, the 
business unit manager informed that while there were major needs for process redesign, the current 
digitization process would only focus implementation of the purchased RIS/PACS system. Further 
changes would follow at a later stage. Subsequently, in April, a formal decision about notice of dis-
missal to about ten percent of the staff, effective at year end, was taken and communicated. 
At this time, however, the business unit manager found that the scheduled personnel reduction would 
be insufficient to meet board expectations on productivity improvements. She informed the manage-
ment team about her assessment and started to work on an action plan that focused new work proc-
esses and organizational structures as direct consequences of the digitization effort. In June, a staff 
meeting was held where a plan for the upcoming implementation was presented. The business unit 
manager then also informed about the restructuring project planned for the fall, and stressed the finan-
cial pressure and budget restrictions facing many of the unit’s clients, particularly the large hospitals. 
At the end of June 2003, the RIS/PACS system went live. After a few initial problems, the system was 
up and running. The physicians were quite satisfied with the system, while the nurses and assistant 
nurses experienced some initial, temporary problems. The anxiety that had been building amongst the 
staff throughout the spring turned into relief. But there was more to come. 
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4.5 Phase 4: Effectuating Personnel Reductions 
In line with the April decision by the business unit manager, the digital radiology system had been 
implemented with a minimum of changes in work processes. Only changes absolutely necessary to 
operate the new system and produce digital radiology images had been implemented and many of 
these changes were made ad hoc during the first hours and days of operation. 
Work here… has sort of deteriorated to the point were nothing is documented anymore. You solve im-
minent problems, and you get all happy about the fact that you made it through another day. Interest in 
building structures that are more effective than the current ones hasn’t really existed here. (Adam, dig-
itization project manager) 
In August 2003, the restructuring effort outlined during the spring was initiated. A “staffing team” was 
formed to analyze the increased potential for personnel reductions following from the digitization 
project. Over the next months, the team produced competence requirements for the future organization 
and job descriptions, finding that a major additional personnel reduction was possible. The staff, how-
ever, was largely of the opinion that further change was unlikely. 
It was like with the digitization decision. Everyone, including the assistant nurses and the secretaries, 
knew that there were going to be changes, but the majority probably thought that nothing was going to 
change anyway. (John, president of PHCO Radiology) 
Based on the staffing team’s work, the business unit manager crafted a document (“The Final Effort”) 
and presented it at a PHCO board meeting, proposing a go-ahead for the personnel reduction effort. 
PHCO Radiology is in need of a fundamental restructuring and a long-term change effort to meet cor-
porate profitability goals as well as present and future demands from personnel, referring clients and 
patients. (Quote from the document “The Final Effort”, by the business unit manager) 
The PHCO board approved the plan and one week later the personnel was informed about the plans. 
External pressures and the potential of the digital technology were again cited as the main reasons be-
hind the impending changes. The plans were met with frustration and skepticism, although the dy-
namic of the change process had also to some extent subdued opposition to change. 
The willingness to change is very low. The digitization is a very big thing, it affects the daily work so 
much, there is no time to think of anything else. At the same time, conflicts disappear from sight when 
you focus on the digitization, [there is] no time to argue with each other…. Change is possible, not be-
cause there is a strong willingness to change, but because resistance is weak right now. (Mary, spe-
cialist physician) 
In October, a process change group was formed and assigned with identifying improvement potential 
in work processes. Throughout the fall, however, process redesign work was overshadowed by the 
notifications of layoffs, effectuated from October to mid-December. While the personnel reduction 
process had been taxing, the state of the unit was not all negative: 
It looks positive with the digitization…. Some [physicians] have resigned, the physicians get stressed 
out – ’what are we gonna do?’ – and want to write a formal letter to management. That’s their problem. 
They do that instead of talking to management. It’s a cultural thing, (Catherine, specialist physician) 
Throwing in the technology was the right thing to do… shocking the system, forcing change to hap-
pen…. (Anna, business unit manager, at management team meeting in December 2003) 
4.6 Phase 5: Work Process Redesign 
In January 2004, lingering stress from the taxing events during the fall contributed to irritation and 
dissent in the management team and amongst staff. 
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Well, Anna and the management team. First of all, the management team is completely anonymous for 
us…. Our only representative there has been fired from the team, and now there are people there we 
don’t know and that we… well, don’t have any connection to…. (Judy, resident physician) 
There is a lot of anxiety …about what they might come up with, without caring about what we say, and 
what the consequences might be. (Jenny, specialist physician) 
In April, process work was reinvigorated by a new design approach. PHCO General Hospital, the larg-
est client, joined the effort and work was focused on redesigning work processes to fit with client 
processes. In five weeks, the group delivered process descriptions and a set of prioritized and detailed 
process improvements. Small improvements were implemented as opportunities arose and further de-
velopments were scheduled to be implemented in the upcoming months. 
During the spring, the business unit manager also decided to initiate a leadership-development pro-
gram to start in the fall. This was partly in response to staff discontent, but also because she had identi-
fied a need for leadership and business development skills among physicians and other key personnel. 
In June, however, the continued discontent resulted in a letter to the CEO of PHCO demanding dis-
missal of the business unit manager. The business unit manager responded to the initiative first 
through an e-mail to all staff, pointing to the pace of the change effort and flaws in ensuring participa-
tion in the effort as causes of discontent. In a second step, the business unit manager and the president 
of PHCO Radiology called an information meeting in which the president stressed that people in-
volved should work to resolve their differences and find common ground. 
4.7 Phase 6: Personnel Development 
After the summer of 2004, the crisis seemed to have dissipated. Previously planned trips for all per-
sonnel were carried out as part of an incentive program. During trips, team-building seminars were 
held. In the seminar material, the business unit manager described the change process thus far, empa-
thized with staff feelings of exclusion and change resistance and stressed that the worst part was over. 
When the leadership development program commenced, participating physicians initially questioned 
its purpose and vented feelings of being forced to participate. Several group development sessions and 
a study trip later, participants increasingly saw the program as valuable for their work. At this time, a 
set of process improvements (mapped out during the spring) were successfully implemented. Further 
process improvements were pursued by a newly formed process-development team and the importance 
of their work was increasingly acknowledged by staff. 
In early 2005, the business unit manager was promoted and the former head of staff planning and 
scheduling took over as business unit manager. The physician group complained of lack of influence 
and work overload. Two additional physicians were recruited, one becoming new chief physician. 
During the year, some physicians increasingly engaged in discussions with management on individual 
basis, expressing views and making arguments based in strategic and/or financial reasoning. 
4.8 Epilogue 
In late 2005, the digital radiology system is fully operative and appreciated by staff. The staff of the 
unit is now at a stable 75 people, down from 100 in 2002, with an increase in the number of radiology 
exams performed. The financial performance of the unit meets corporate/owner demands, and re-
sponse time for radiology exams meets client expectations. In late 2006, these conditions still hold. 
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5 CHANGING WHEN YOU CAN’T: A RESOURCE/CAPABILITY 
RE-BALANCING ACT 
In this section, we discuss how the change effort in the studied radiology unit shifted in focus over 
time, identifying what organizational resources and operative capabilities were focused during each 
phase. We also connect this to the presence or absence of dynamic capabilities (please refer to Table 1 
as needed) and discuss how these dynamic capabilities evolved during the change process. 
In phase one, the change effort focused only one resource: technology. This focus probably helped 
gain momentum and broke with earlier change efforts. It can also be understood as a consequence of 
outside pressure and lack of dynamic capabilities to drive and manage change: the unit did not possess 
capabilities in process innovation, organizational restructuring, change management or project work. 
Arguably, the organizational capability to address emotional needs of employees was also limited. 
In the second phase, the resource/capability scope of the project was broadened to include not only 
technology but also organizational structures and routines, including process design. This can be un-
derstood as a consequence of the business unit manager’s identification of lack of user participation. 
Events during this period also testify to the lack of capability to conduct project work on a wider scale. 
As a consequence, in phase three efforts were concentrated on implementing the digital radiology 
technology. The lack of relevant dynamic capabilities (in process innovation, restructuring, change 
management, project work) and the outside pressure partly account for this change. In addition, this 
change in scope and focus addressed the organization’s history and sentiment of failing to change: 
with problems plaguing the project, there was a clear risk that the change effort would ebb out into 
disillusionment, inactivity and resistance. The choice to push change with the new technology was 
therefore not only a response to outside demands, but also a way to demonstrate that change was pos-
sible. The new technology also paved way for a shift in the configuration of organizational resources 
and capabilities: suddenly, new procedures were possible. 
In the fourth phase, when the RIS/PACS system was up and running, focus shifted to the personnel 
resource. While process redesign would have benefited the use of the new system, efforts in this area 
did not gain momentum until later, when personnel reductions had been effectuated. The organization 
did not have the capacity to address process redesign and personnel reductions simultaneously. Fur-
thermore, “quick wins” were important both due to the financial situation and to reinforce the change 
effort through continued disconfirmation of the status quo. The personnel reductions effectuated dur-
ing the fall provided additional evidence that the world had changed: this was not the stable environ-
ment of the previous decades, neither was it the change-incapable environment of recent time. It was 
established that the organization was capable of change; change management capability increased. The 
layoffs also further increased the pressure to rethink work practices. 
With the fundamental changes in resources – the new technology and the new personnel structure – 
the radiology unit had the structural, but not yet the processual, prerequisites for improved operative 
and financial performance. In the fifth phase, the focus of the change effort switched to work proc-
esses. Process redesign work finally gained momentum, and process improvements were achieved on 
the basis of continued use of a well-functioning, stable digital radiology system. At this time, a re-bal-
ancing is taking place within the unit: the new technology, the size and competence of the staff and the 
work processes increasingly match each other. The effects of the combined change efforts are mani-
fested in improved operative performance, successful response to client demands and financial per-
formance. 
The unit also exhibited dynamic capabilities in organizational restructuring, process innovation and 
change management, while emotional capability had not developed significantly. After the unsuccess-
ful broad involvement of stakeholders in the second phase, change efforts were driven through tar-
geted efforts driven by small teams. The emotional strain from the accelerated, often non-participative 
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change processes erupted in dissent. While resources and capabilities were being re-balanced into a 
coherent and well-functioning operation, the change process was not entirely in balance. 
In phase six, the resource primarily focused is again personnel, but this time with focus on competence 
development and staff–management interaction. The leadership program partly countered dissent 
amongst physicians. We can also see that the organization by now had acquired some capacity to con-
duct change with a broader focus: process innovations continue and help build capabilities related to 
service delivery. The organization had by now broken the earlier change deadlock. 
However, as a consequence of accelerated, largely non-participative change, development of emo-
tional capability was still limited at best. It is possible that development of this capability was subordi-
nated to making change possible; perhaps attending to emotional needs was seen as posing a risk of 
fallback to earlier, ineffective change efforts. On the one hand, the fact that the unit had made it 
through an exceptionally turbulent period and arrived at a more stable situation, without imminent 
threats to the unit’s survival, might have built capacity for uncertainty and ambiguity amongst em-
ployees. On the other hand, the stress and pressure of living through change had also caused emotional 
strain. Change had become part of everyday organizational life, but it had not become the norm or the 
preferred state. While resources and operative capabilities were re-balanced, emotional re-balancing 
partly remained. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
The findings from this case suggest that pushing organizational change with technology may not al-
ways be an inferior strategy for IT-related change. Especially when an organization lacks the dynamic 
capabilities necessary to effectuate change “by the book”, the focus on one resource or capability at a 
time might lead to small wins in the short tem while over time contributing to a more change-able, 
organization. In such circumstances, technology might sometimes be the first resource focused. Con-
sequently, pushing change with technology might be a workable, emergent strategy for coping with 
difficult preconditions for change. 
It should be noted that our findings do not constitute a readily repeatable implementation method. 
Rather, what we have found is that when an organization is unable to pursue IT-related change in ac-
cordance with the canonical view, an approach that contrasts quite starkly with the canonical view 
might be viable. However, it was also found that the successive, focused change efforts and the accel-
erated pace of change contributed to dissent and resistance in the organization: thus, a critical aspect of 
employing the observed approach is to detect and act upon the need for re-balancing not only of re-
sources and capabilities, but also emotional rebalancing. 
Furthermore, the observed strategy might work only under certain conditions, which may include 
characteristics of the technology deployed, the range and complexity of operative processes affected, 
user group characteristics and the ways in which power relations are impacted. Also, the case also 
shows that this strategy has consequences for the development of organizational capabilities. It may 
lead to temporary skill deficiencies and sustainment of ineffective work processes. It may also fuel 
conflict and distrust in management. These risks need to be balanced against progress achieved 
through successive, targeted efforts. 
On the other hand, an upside of the change strategy is that it makes is possible to work separately, and 
at different time periods, with challenges such as learning a new technological tool, coping with per-
sonnel reductions, and changing work processes. In contrast to an optimal, balanced approach to 
change, the approach described in this paper can thus be understood as sequential, emergent and partly 
opportunistic. The successive shifts in focus also shape a process of repeated disruption and re-bal-
ancing. In this type of process, the challenge is not to avoid disruption, but to allow for and facilitate 
re-balancing of resources, skills and capabilities after a disruptive change has occurred. The challenge 
is to manage this re-balancing act so that opposition to change does not halt the process. It comes with 
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the territory that such re-balancing is likely to be temporary, serving as the ground for another wave of 
disruptive change. 
The findings from this study are particularly important in a time when organizations are increasingly 
required to change rapidly and where technological advances continuously change the rules for what 
can and cannot be done. Consequently, more research is needed into varieties of approaches to IT-re-
lated change. One way to conduct this research is to pursue opportunities to study cases where unor-
thodox approaches to change have been successful. We believe that this should be done not with an 
immediate aim to produce normative advice on successful change methods, but rather to first better 
understand and uncover the anatomy of IT-related change in a variety of circumstances – perhaps par-
ticularly such circumstances that make traditional approaches unviable. While this study has focused 
lack of dynamic capabilities as a reason to divert from the canonical approach, hyper-competition and 
start-ups are examples of other conditions or circumstances where non-traditional IT implementation 
approaches may useful or necessary. Such conditions should not be treated as anomalies within IS re-
search, but as part of an expanding variety of contexts to which IT implementation approaches must 
adapt. 
For future practice, the perhaps most central implication of the study can be formulated quite con-
cretely: When you cannot do IT-related organizational change the way you should, do it the way you 
can, one step at a time. 
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